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Abstract
This paper provides the rst evidence about pure exporters (i.e.,
rms exporting all of their output to the foreign market)  a phe-
nomenon overlooked and cannot be explained in the existing litera-
ture. It then o¤ers a generalized model of Melitz (2003) for examining
the existence and behavior of pure exporters. In particular, pure ex-
porters arise when the export market is su¢ ciently large a situation
more likely to hold in developing countries as opposed to large de-
veloped countries; and their productivity levels are above those of
non-exporters, but below those of rms having both domestic sales
and export. These theoretical predictions are borne out in a data of
Chinese manufacturing rms for the period of 1998-2005.
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1 Introduction
In the past decade, there has been a growing literature on rm heterogeneity
and exporting behavior. A dominant theoretical explanation is that more
productive rms self-select to become exporters (e.g., Melitz, 2003). Speci-
cally, in Melitzs framework, there is a xed cost of production, and a xed
cost of exporting but no xed cost of selling in the domestic market. As a
result, in equilibrium there are only two types of rms: less productive rms
sell only in the domestic market, while more productive rms have both
domestic sales and export.1
In reality, however, there are rms exporting all of their output (called
pure exporters). For example, McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999) report that in
their sample of rms in Vietnam, as high as 9% of them exports all of their
production. Meanwhile, from a sample of Chinese manufacturing rms for
the period of 1998-2005, we nd that nearly 3% rms are pure exporters. How
to explain the existence of pure exporters? And what kinds of rms choose
to become pure exporters? In this paper, we o¤er a theoretical explanation
for pure exporters, and then test the theoretical predictions using a data of
Chinese manufacturing rms.
In our theoretical analysis, we build upon Melitz (2003)s framework by
generalizing its key assumption about xed cost of selling. Instead of assum-
ing that there is no xed cost of selling in the domestic market but a xed
cost of exporting, we assume that there is also a xed cost for domestic sales
albeit lower than that of exporting. Under this more generalized framework,
we have the same results as in Melitz (2003) when the export market is not
su¢ ciently large, that is, there are just two types of rms in equilibrium with
the more productive rms having both domestic sales and export while the
less productive rms selling only in the domestic market. However, when the
export market is su¢ ciently large, there are three types of rms in equilib-
rium: rms having both domestic sales and export are the most productive,
followed by pure exporters, and nally by rms with domestic sales only.
The intuition for our theoretical results is as follows. The three types
of rms di¤er in the xed costs of operations (including both production
and sales): rms with both domestic sales and export have the highest xed
costs, followed by pure exporters, and nally by rms with domestic sales
only. Meanwhile they also di¤er in the production e¢ ciency, which is jointly
determined by the unit cost of production and market size. As the unit cost
of production is the same across the three types of rms (because production
1Existing empirical studies only include a dummy indicating whether or not a rm
exports without distinguishing pure exporters from exporters that also have domestic
sales (see for example, Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999).
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takes place in the same country), the variations in production e¢ ciency come
from the di¤erences in market size, with a bigger market size leading to higher
production e¢ ciency.
It is clear that rms with both domestic sales and export have the highest
production e¢ ciency among the three. However, the ranking in production
e¢ ciency between rms with domestic sales only and rms with export only
depends on the relative size of the domestic market vis-à-vis the export mar-
ket. When the export market is su¢ ciently larger than the domestic market,
rms with both domestic sales and export have the highest production e¢ -
ciency, followed by pure exporters, and nally by rms with domestic sales
only. Combined with the ranking in xed costs of operations, it follows that
rms having both domestic sales and export are the most productive, followed
by pure exporters, and nally by rms with domestic sales only. However,
when the export market is not su¢ ciently large, rms with domestic sales
have higher production e¢ ciency than pure exporters, and they dominate
pure exporters as they also enjoy lower xed costs of operations. Hence, in
equilibrium, there are only two types of rms, with the more productive rms
having both domestic sales and export while the less productive rms selling
only in the domestic market.
Next, using the data set of Chinese manufacturing rms, we compare the
three types of rms in terms of productivity. Preliminary statistics reported
in Table 1 show that rms having both domestic sales and export always have
the highest rank among the three types of rms in terms of employment, xed
assets, output, and productivity.2 On the other hand, rms with domestic
sales have the lowest ranking except in the category of xed assets. For
further empirical analysis, we regress rm productivity on a dummy variable
for domestic sales only, and a dummy variable for domestic sales and export,
together with a list of industry, region and year dummies. Regression results
show that rms with domestic sales and export have the highest productivity,
followed by pure exporters, and nally by rms with domestic sales only.
These results are robust to the exclusion of outlying observations, to the
inclusion of rm size, an alternative classication of Chinese domestic rms,
two sub-samples, and an alternative estimation method. These empirical
results are consistent with our theoretical predictions.
This paper contributes to the literature by being the rst one document-
ing and then o¤ering a generalized model of Melitz (2003) to explain the
existence and behavior of pure exporters. In particular, pure exporters arise
2Here we estimate the total factor productivity using four di¤erent methodologies,
that is, OLS, xed-e¤ect, GMM, and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)s. Details of these
estimations are presented in Section 3.
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when the export market is su¢ ciently large vis-a-vis the domestic market, a
situation more likely to hold in developing countries than in large developed
countries. This also explains why we are able to identify pure exporters that
are overlooked in the existing literature, because our empirical work utilizes
the data from China in contrast to most of the existing work that use data
from large developed countries.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. A theoretical analysis
of pure exporters is o¤ered in Section 2, while empirical tests of the theoretical
predictions are presented in Section 3. The paper concludes with Section 4.
2 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we provide a generalized model of Melitz (2003) to explain the
existence of pure exporters and analyze its di¤erences from other two types
of rms (rms with both domestic sales and export, and non-exporters).
There are two countries (i.e., home (H) and foreign (F )), two sectors (i.e., a
homogeneous good (X) produced with a constant returns to scale technology
and a continuum of di¤erentiated goods (Y ) produced with an increasing
returns to scale technology), and one production factor (labor).
Following the literature, we take the homogeneous good (X) as a numéraire
and assume the utility function for the di¤erentiated goods (Y ) to be a con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Then the demand function
for variety ! of the di¤erentiated goods Y in country l can be derived as:
yl(!) = 
 
1  I l(pl(!))
 1
1  (1)
where l 2 fH;Fg is the index for the country; yl(!) is the consumption
of variety ! of the di¤erentiated goods Y in country l; I l  M l(Y l) 1  is
the measure for the size of market in country l, where M l is the number
of consumers and Y l is the index of aggregate consumption of di¤erentiated
goods in country l; and pl(!) is the price of variety ! in country l. The
elasticity of substitution between any two di¤erentiated goods is   1=(1 
) > 1. The variety parameter ! is left out hereon as all the cases are
symmetric.
The production of the di¤erentiated goods (y) takes place in the home
country. The unit production cost is given by c=, where  is the rm-specic
productivity measure drawn from a common distribution. Meanwhile, the
xed cost of production is same across all rms and given by fp. Moreover,
the transport cost of di¤erentiated goods to the foreign market takes the
form of an iceberg cost, i.e., one needs t > 1 units of nal product in order
to ship 1 unit to an abroad market.
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Thus far the setup is the same as in Melitz (2003). The departure of
our model from his lies in the assumption about the xed cost of selling
the di¤erentiated goods. In Melitz (2003), it is assumed that there is zero
xed cost of selling in the home market, but a positive xed cost of selling
in the foreign market. In contrast, we assume that there is also a positive
xed cost of selling the home market (denoted by fHs ), though it is lower
than the xed cost of selling in the foreign market (denoted by fFs ), which is
lower than the xed cost of selling in both markets (denoted by fHFs ), i.e.,
0 < fHs < f
F
s < f
HF
s .
A rm needs to decide where to sell its products. There are three possible
choices: selling only in the home market (non-exporters), selling only in the
foreign market (pure exporters), and selling in both home and foreign mar-
kets. For ease of exposition, we denote these three choices by (H), (F ),
and (HF ), respectively.
Given the above setup, we can derive the equilibrium prot function for
these three choices as:8>><>>:
(H) =
(1 )IH
C
  (fp + fHs )
(F ) =
(1 ) IF
T
C
  (fp + fFs )
(HF ) =
(1 )

IH+ I
F
T

C
  (fp + fHFs )
; (2)
where    1  is a monotonic transform of productivity ; C  c 1  is
a monotonic transform of unit production cost c; T  t 1  is a monotonic
transform of transport cost t; and I l is the market size in country l, l 2
fH;Fg.
Note that the prot function for each of these three choices is a linear
function of , and it just di¤ers in the slope term (denoted by ) and the
intercept term (the negative of all the xed costs, denoted by F ). The
comparison of the xed costs across the three choices is straightforward, in
which:
F(H) < F(F ) < F(HF ); (3)
where F(H) = fp + fHs ; F(F ) = fp + f
F
s ; and F(HF ) = fp + f
HF
s .
The slope term () is determined by the unit cost of production (the
denominator, C) and the size of the markets (the nominator,
X
I l). As
the production takes place only in the home market, the three choices have
the same unit cost of production, and they only di¤er in the size of the
markets. The choice (HF ) involves the selling in both the home and the
foreign markets, and thus it has the largest market coverage or the steepest
slope term. The comparison of the slope term between the choice (H) and
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the choice (F ) hinges upon the relative size of the home market and the
foreign market (adjusted by the transport cost). When the (transport-cost-
adjusted) foreign market is smaller than the home market (that is, I
F
T
< IH),
the slope term of the choice (H) is steeper than that of the choice (F ).
When the (transport-cost-adjusted) foreign market is larger than the home
market (that is, I
F
T
 IH), the slope term of the choice (F ) is steeper than
that of the choice (H). So we have the following ranking of the slope term
for these three choices:(
(F ) < (H) < (HF ) when
IF
T
< IH
(H) < (F ) < (HF ) when
IF
T
> IH
; (4)
where (H) =
(1 )
C
IH ; (F ) =
(1 )
C
IF
T
; and (HF ) =
(1 )
C

IH + I
F
T

.
With inequalities (3) and (4), it follows that the optimal choice for a rm
depends on its productivity:
Proposition: When the foreign market is not su¢ ciently large, in equi-
librium there are only two types of rms: the more productive rms sell in
both the home and foreign markets, while the less productive rms sell only in
the home market (the non-exporters). When foreign markets are su¢ ciently
large, in equilibrium there are three types of rms: the most productive rms
sell in both the home and foreign markets, the least productive ones sell only
in the home market (the non-exporters), and those in the middle sell only in
foreign markets (the pure exporters).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuition for the proposition is as follows. For the case where the
foreign market is not su¢ ciently large, the choice of selling only in the for-
eign market ((F )) is always dominated by the choice of selling only in the
home market ((H)). This is because the former has a higher xed costs but
a smaller market coverage than the latter. Meanwhile, compared with the
choice of selling in both the home and the foreign markets ((HF )), (H)
has a lower xed costs but a smaller market coverage. Thus, the equilib-
rium choice depends on rm productivity as elucidated in the literature on
rm heterogeneity and exporting behavior, with the more productive rms
choosing (HF ) while the less productive ones choosing (H).
For the case where the foreign market is su¢ ciently large, none of these
three choices is always dominated by others. As we move from the choice of
selling only in the home market ((H)), to the choice of selling only in the
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foreign market ((F )), and nally to the choice of selling in both the home
and foreign markets ((HF )), the xed costs are increasing (i.e., F(H) <
F(F ) < F(HF )), but so are the market coverage (i.e., (H) < (F ) <
(HF )). The equilibrium choice depends on rm productivity, namely, the
most productive rms choose (HF ), the least productive ones choose (H),
and those in the middle choose (F ).
It is interesting to point out why pure exporters do not exist in equilibrium
under Melitz (2003)s framework. In Melitz (2003), it is assumed that the
xed cost of selling in the home market is zero (i.e., fHs = 0). Under this
assumption, the choice of selling only in the foreign market ((F )) is always
dominated by the choice of selling in both the home and the foreign markets
((HF )). This is because the former has the same xed costs as the latter
(i.e., F(F ) = F(HF )), but has a smaller market coverage than the latter (i.e.,
(F ) < (HF )). Intuitively, as there is no extra xed cost of selling in the
home market, rms always have sales in the home market.
Under our more generalized framework (i.e., 0 < fHs < f
F
s ), however, pure
exporters may exist in equilibrium, and the condition for its existence is that
the foreign market is su¢ ciently larger than the home market. However, if
this condition is not satised, the choice of selling in the foreign market (or
the pure exporters) is dominated by the choice of selling only in the home
market (or the non-exporters), and the equilibrium choice is between selling
only in the home market ((H)) and selling in both the home and foreign
markets ((HF )) just as in Melitz (2003).
3 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis uses data from annual surveys of manufacturing rms
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the period of 1998
to 2005. These annual surveys covered all state-owned enterprises, and those
non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales of ve million Chinese currency
(about US$650,000) or more. The data provides detailed information on
rmsidentication, operations and performance, including rm ownership,
output and export, which are of special interest to this study. The number
of manufacturing rms varies from over 140,000 in the late 1990s to over
243,000 in 2005. The percentage of Chinas total exports contributed by
rms in our dataset was just below 70% in late 1990s, and was as high as
76% in 2005, indicating that our data set is highly comprehensive.
According to the classication of the National Bureau of Statistics of
China, rms with more than 25% equity shares held by foreign multina-
tionals are classied as foreign a¢ liates, and the rest is classied as Chinas
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domestic rms. As the literature almost exclusively examines the exporting
behavior of domestic rms, in this study we also focus on the exporting be-
havior of domestic rms, and hence simply refer to domestic rms as rms.3
The number of rms in China with valid information on export, output, em-
ployment, xed assets and intermediate inputs ranges from 112,246 in 1998
to 192,234 in 2005. As shown in Table 1, for the period of 1998-2005, 80.96%
of rms only sell in the home market, 15.75% of rms have sales in both the
home and foreign markets, and nally 3.29% of rms sell only in the foreign
market.
To estimate total factor productivity (TFP), we rst use the OLS re-
gression method. Specically, we use the constant value of output, deate
the xed assets by the xed-assets investment price index and intermedi-
ate inputs by the producer price index, and estimate for rms in each 2-digit
industry and each year (see also Bernard and Jensen, 1999). The OLS estima-
tion of TFP, however, may su¤er from the simultaneity problem, specically,
input choices could be endogenously determined by unobservable productiv-
ity shocks. This may lead to an upward bias in the estimation coe¢ cients of
more variable inputs such as capital (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). We therefore
use three alternative estimation methods, that is, panel xed-e¤ect estima-
tion, the instrumental estimation (i.e., GMM), and semi-parametric estima-
tion4 (i.e., Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)s TFP estimation method).5 Table
2 provides the correlation among these four di¤erent measures of TFP.
Table 1 also provides some preliminary comparison of these three types
of rms in terms of output, employment, xed assets, and TFP. It is clear
that rms with sales in both the home and foreign markets always have the
largest output, employment and xed assets, and the highest TFP. Mean-
while, except for xed assets, rms with domestic sales only have smallest
output and employment, and the lowest TFP. These preliminary results, in
particular the TFP, are consistent with our theoretical predictions.
To further investigate the exporting behavior of rms in China, we esti-
3In addition, as shown in Lu, Lu, and Tao (2010), the exporting behavior of foreign
a¢ liates is rather di¤erent and complicated, as multinationals can choose the location of
production as well as the location of market.
4Another semi-parametric estimation method for dealing with the endogeneity problem
is Olley and Pakes method (1996), which uses investment as a proxy for unobservable
productivity shocks. However, there is substantial missing information on investment in
our data. Therefore Olley and Pakes method is not econometrically e¢ cient in our case.
5However, these three alternative estimation methods may also have their own esti-
mation concerns, for example, the semi-parametric estimation may lead to larger biases
than the OLS estimates if unobservable productivity shocks are mostly transitory and the
rm xed e¤ects are signicant. For detailed discussion on the di¤erences among various
methods for estimating TFP, please see Van Biesebroeck (2007).
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mate the following equation:
TFPfirt = + Homefirt+ Home and Foreignfirt+i+r+t+"firt (5)
where TFPfirt is the TFP of rm f in industry i, region r and year t;
Homefirt is a dummy variable having value of one if rm f sells only in
the home market, and zero otherwise; Home and Foreignfirt is a dummy
variable having value of one if rm f sells in both the home and foreign mar-
kets, and zero otherwise; i, r and t are 4-digit industry dummy, region
dummy,6 and year dummy, respectively; and "firt is the error term. To deal
with the possible heteroskedasticity problem, we use the robust standard
error clustered at the rm level.
Regression results for equation (5) are reported in Table 3. We use TFP
estimated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)e method as the dependent
variable in Column (1), TFP estimated using OLS method as the dependent
variable in Column (2), TFP estimated using panel xed-e¤ect method as the
dependent variable in Column (3), and nally TFP estimated using GMM as
the dependent variable in Column (4). It is clear that in all these regressions,
the coe¢ cient for Homefirt is negative and statistically signicant, whereas
the coe¢ cient for Home and Foreignfirt is positive and statistically signif-
icant. These results suggest that rms having sales in both the home and
foreign markets are the most productive, followed by rms with sales only in
the foreign market, and nally, by rms with sales only in the home market.
As shown in the Proposition in Section 2, pure exporters arise only when
the export market is su¢ ciently large vis-à-vis the domestic market, and
their productivity levels lie between those of non-exporters and those of rms
having both domestic sales and export. It is reasonable to argue that the
condition of su¢ ciently large export market holds more likely for developing
countries such as China as compared with large developed countries such
as the United States. Indeed our identication of the existence of pure ex-
porters among the Chinese manufacturers lends support to the above argu-
ment. Moreover, our empirical ndings on the productivity ranking across
the three types of rms lend further support to our theoretical predictions in
the Proposition.
In the remaining part of this section, we conduct a series of robustness
checks on the productivity ranking of non-exporters, pure exporters, and
rms with sales in both the home and the foreign markets. As the results
with each of these four measures of TFP are similar, we only report the
estimation results using TFP estimated by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)s
method as the dependent variable to save space.
6Region here refers to 22 provinces, 4 province-level municipalities, and 5 minority
autonomous regions in China.
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First, to address the concern that our results could be driven by some
outlying observations, we exclude the top and bottom 1% observations in
our sample and repeat the analysis. The results shown in Column 1 of Table
4 demonstrate clearly that out ndings in Table 3 remain robust.
Second, to make sure that our ndings are not entirely driven by rm
size, we incorporate Firm Size (dened as the logarithm of employment) in
the regression analysis. The result reported in Column 2 of Table 4 reveal
that our ndings remain robust to the inclusion of Firm Size.
Third, we use an alternative denition of domestic rms  the o¢ cial
ownership type reported by rms in the survey instead of that implied by
equity ownership. Specically, there are ve types of ownership: state-owned
rms, collectively-owned rms, joint-stock companies, privately-owned rms,
and foreign-invested rms. We treat rms with the rst four types of own-
ership as domestic rms. As shown in Column 3 of Table 4, our ndings
remain robust to this alternative denition of domestic rms.
Fourth, we split the whole sample into two sub-samples to take care of
the possible changes of exporting behavior over time. In particular, China
entered into the WTO near the end of 2001, which might facilitate the export
of Chinas domestic rms and enlarge the foreign market vis-à-vis the domes-
tic market. Hence, we split the sample period into two, the pre-WTO period
(1998-2001) and the post-WTO period (2002-2005), and repeat the analysis.
As shown in Columns 4-5 of Table 4, the estimated coe¢ cients for Homefirt
are negative and statistically signicant for both the pre- and the post-WTO
periods, though the magnitude of the coe¢ cient drops substantially from the
pre- to the post-WTO period. Intuitively, with Chinas entry into the WTO,
entry barriers into the foreign market are lowered down (or transport cost
t drops in our model), which narrows down the productivity gap between
non-exporters and pure exporters. Meanwhile, the estimated coe¢ cients for
Home and Foreignfirt are positive and statistically signicant for both the
pre- and the post-WTO periods, with similar magnitudes. Intuitively, the
productivity gap between pure exporters and rms with sales in both the
home and foreign markets is driven by the xed cost of selling in the home
market as well as the size of the home market, none of which is signicantly
a¤ected by Chinas entry into the WTO.
Lastly, to reect the self-selection feature of exporting behavior by rms
in terms of their productivity levels as stated in the Proposition, we use
an alternative estimation method, that is, multinomial logistic estimation.7
7Another two possible choices are ordered probit estimation and ordered logit esti-
mation. The advantage of multinomial logit estimation over these two methods is that
multinomial logit estimation places no order on the dependent variable that takes ordinal
values.
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Specically, we construct a new variable, called Exporting Statusfirt, which
takes a value of 1 if a rm sells only in the home market, a value of 2 if
it sells in both the home and foreign markets, and a value of 3 if it sells
only in foreign markets. Set Exporting Statusfirt = 1 as the base outcome
and the multinomial logistic estimation generates two relative risk ratios,
corresponding to the other two outcomes (that is, Exporting Statusfirt = 2
and Exporting Statusfirt = 3). A relative risk ratio for the explanatory
variable Xk measures the change in the predicted odds favoring Exporting
Statusfirt = j 2 f2; 3g relative to the base outcomeExporting Statusfirt = 1
associated with an 1-unit increase in Xk. In other words, the relative risk
ratio (rrrj1) for Xk takes the following form:
rrrj1 =
P (ExportingStatusfirt = jjXk + 1)
P (ExportingStatusfirt = 1jXk + 1)=
P (ExportingStatusfirt = jjXk)
P (ExportingStatusfirt = 1jXk) :
Hence, rrrj1 > 1 means that with an increase in Xk, a rm is more likely
to choose outcome value j relative to the base outcome; whereas rrrj1 < 1
means that with an increase inXk, a rm is less likely to choose outcome value
j relative to the base outcome. In our regression, we take Xk = TFPfirt 1
and control for 4-digit industry dummy, region dummy and year dummy.
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. As shown in Column 2, the
relative risk ratio for outcome ExportingStatusfirt = 3 over basic outcome
ExportingStatusfirt = 1 (rrr31) is 1:392 > 1 and statistically signicant.
This means that with an increase in rm productivity level in the last period,
a rm is more likely to switch from selling only in the home market to selling
only in foreign markets, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction
in the Proposition. Given the relative risk ratio rrr21 in Column 1, we can
calculate the relative risk ratio for outcome ExportingStatusfirt = 2 over
outcome ExportingStatusfirt = 3, that is
rrr23 = rrr21=rrr31 = 2:268 > 1:
This means that an increase in rm productivity level is associated with
a higher probability of selling in both the home and foreign markets than
selling only in foreign markets, which is again consistent with the theoretical
prediction in the Proposition.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies the existence and behavior of pure exporters, which are
overlooked and cannot be explained by the existing literature. Using a gener-
alized model of Melitz (2003), we rst identify the condition for the existence
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of pure exporters, that is, the su¢ ciently large foreign market relative to the
domestic market. We then show that in the presence of pure exporters,
their productivity levels are above those of non-exporters, but below those
of rms having both domestic sales and export. To examine the relevance
of these theoretical predictions, we use a data of manufacturing rms for the
period of 1998-2005 from China, for which the foreign market is arguably
much larger compared with the domestic market. From this data, we nd
quite a substantial number of pure exporters, and their productivity ranking
vis-à-vis the other two types of rms highly consistent with our theoretical
predictions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition: Let us rst consider the case that the foreign market is
not su¢ ciently large, i.e., I
F
T
< IH . In this case, the choice (F ) (selling only
in the foreign market or pure exporting) is dominated by the choice (H)
(selling only in the home market or domestic sale only), as
(F ) =
(1  ) IF
T
C
  (fp + fFs )
<
(1  )IH
C
  (fp + fFs )
<
(1  )IH
C
  (fp + fHs ) = (H):
The rst inequality comes as I
F
T
< IH , while the second inequality is due
to the assumption 0 < fHs < f
F
s . Hence, in the equilibrium, there are only
two available choices: (H) and (HF ) (selling in both home and foreign
markets).
Denote the cuto¤ point 1 as (H)(1) = 0, i.e.,
1 =
fp + f
H
s
(1  )IHC
and the cuto¤ point 2 as (H)(2) = (HF )(2), i.e.,
2 =
fHFs   fHs
(1  ) IF
T
C
When I
F
T
< f
HF
s  fHs
fp+fHs
IH , we have
0 < 1 < 2:
Thus, we have a clear dichotomy that when the foreign market is not suf-
ciently large, more productive rms sell in both the home and the foreign
markets and less productive rms sell only in the home market.
Next, let us consider the case that foreign market is su¢ ciently large, i.e.,
IF
T
> IH . In this case, in the equilibrium, there are three available choices:
(H) , (F ) and (HF ).
Denote the cuto¤ point 01 as (H)(
0
1) = 0 i.e.,
01 =
fp + f
H
s
(1  )IHC
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and the cuto¤ point 02 as (H)(
0
2) = (F )(
0
2), i.e.,
02 =
fFs   fHs
(1  )

IF
T
  IH
C
and the cuto¤ point 03 as (F )(
0
3) = (HF )(
0
3), i.e.,
03 =
fHFs   fFs
(1  )IHC:
When fp+f
F
s
fp+fHs
IH > I
F
T
> f
HF
s  fHs
fHFs  fFs I
H , we have
0 < 01 < 
0
2 < 
0
3:
Thus, the most productive rms sell in both the home and foreign markets,
followed by those selling in the foreign market only, and then by those selling
in the home market only.
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Table 1, Comparison of three types of Chinese manufacturers 
 
  Domestic Sales Only Domestic Sales and Export Export Only 
Number of Observations 841,818 163,730 34,244 
Share of Total Sample 80.96% 15.75% 3.29% 
Logarithm of Employment 4.656 5.452 4.988 
Logarithm of Output 9.363 10.316 9.553 
Logarithm of Fixed Assets 8.158 8.925 7.487 
TFP LP 3.747 4.121 3.834 
 
Table 2, Correlations among different measures of TFP 
 
  TFP LP TFP OLS TFP FE TFP GMM 
TFP LP 1.0000     
TFP OLS 0.6681  1.0000    
TFP FE 0.9118  0.9060  1.0000   
TFP GMM 0.9222  0.8907  0.9971  1.0000  
Table 3, Main Results, OLS Estimates 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Dependent Variable TFP LP TFP OLS TFP FE TFP GMM 
Domestic Sales Only -0.139*** -0.014*** -0.054*** -0.044*** 
 [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
Domestic Sales and Export 0.190*** 0.021*** 0.078*** 0.096*** 
 [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
Constant -0.805*** -2.840*** -1.948*** -1.927*** 
 [0.033] [0.016] [0.021] [0.022] 
Number of Observations 1,039,792 1,039,792 1,039,792 1,039,792 
R-squared 0.2033 0.1159 0.1581 0.1636 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Table 4, Robustness Checks, OLS Estimates 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable TFP LP 
Estimation Specification 
Excluding Outlying 
Observations 
Including Firm Size 
as an Additional 
Control 
Alternative 
Definition of 
Domestic Firms 
Subsample of Firms 
from 1998-2001 
Subsample of Firms 
from 2002-2005 
Domestic Sales Only -0.116*** -0.014*** -0.137*** -0.172*** -0.103*** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] 
Domestic Sales and Export 0.167*** 0.098*** 0.207*** 0.202*** 0.192*** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] 
Constant 3.378*** -1.313*** -0.809*** -0.810*** 4.147*** 
 [0.194] [0.026] [0.034] [0.042] [0.271] 
Number of Observations 1,018,996 1,039,792 1,025,030 462,642 577,150 
R-squared 0.1964 0.3533 0.2070 0.2191 0.1650 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Table 5, Robustness Check, Multinomial Logistic Estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  1 2 
Number of 
Observations 
Pseudo R2  Exporting Status=2 Exporting Status=3 
Independent Variable Lag 1-year TFP LP 
Relative Risk Ratio 3.157*** 1.392*** 
631,052 0.2172 
 [0.039] [0.028] 
